Introduction
In the last two decades of the twentieth century many western democracies have seen the rise of parties that have been labelled extreme-right (Ignazi, 1992; Hainsworth 2000) , New Radical Right (Kitschelt 1995) , Radical Right (Fennema 1997) . In this paper we study the motives of citizens in supporting these parties.
Ideologically these parties are a mixed bag. Some of them are directly inspired by fascist intellectuals from the 1930s and speak of the fall of Western civilization (see e.g., Fennema and Pollman, 1998) 1 , whereas others have no sympathy at all for the fascist past, and have even criticized the lack of forms of direct democracy in parliamentary democracies. Some have a program that promotes a free market economy, whereas others have objected to free market arrangements, particularly when it comes to international trade. When Fennema (1997) studied the ideologies of the Western European parties that belong to this group, he concluded that the main thing they have in common is their fierce opposition to immigration, which is the reason why he proposed calling them anti-immigrant parties and, more recently, antiimmigration parties. This term is well suited to the description of West-
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299 study of 1999 data in 8 political systems gave a different picture. For the large and successful radical right parties, such as the FPÖ, Vlaams Blok and Alleanza Nazionale these conclusions were still valid. However, in the case of support for small and unsuccessful radical right parties such as the Wallonian Front National, the German Republikaner and the Dutch Centrumdemocraten, this was not the case. They therefore concluded that two groups of radical right parties had developed by 1999. One group of parties is evaluated by their potential supporters on the basis of the same kind of substantive considerations that also motivate support for other parties. We could thus say that citizens treat them as 'normal' parties. The other group is apparently not evaluated on the basis of ideological and pragmatic considerations.
The purpose of the current paper is to replicate the analyses of 1994 and 1999 with data from the EES 2004. This will enable us to assess whether the situation has changed compared to 1999. Moreover, these data enable us to assess the determinants of the vote for three radical right parties that were not included in previous studies: Laos (from Greece), the LPF (from the Netherlands) and the Hungarian Justice and Life Party. The EES 2004 also allows us to replicate the findings for 6 parties that were also included in 1999: the Austrian FPÖ, the Danish Folkepartit, the German Republikaner, the Italian Alleanza Nazionale and Lega Nord, and the French Front National.
2

What motivates voting for radical right parties?
Different kinds of theoretical approaches exist to explain support for radical right parties, as well as differences in aggregate support for such parties.
These approaches have looked at demand side as well as supply side factors.
In this paper we focus on the motivation which leads individual voters to support radical right parties, which is why our focus is mainly on the demand 300 In addition to the social isolation thesis, an ethnic competition thesis has been proposed. According to this explanation, support for radical right parties comes from those citizens who feel threatened by rapid changes in postindustrial societies. Blue-collar workers with low education feel insecure because of globalisation and immigration. They compete with immigrant groups for scarce resources such as jobs and houses. These "losers of modernity" (Betz 1998 ) feel threatened by rapid social change and tend to support radical right-wing parties out of resentment against immigrants and against politicians in general, who are held responsible for their uncertainty.
Research has shown that voters who fit Betz' profile -the so called "angry white men"-are more likely than other citizens to support radical right Eijk et al. 1996) .
In the literature the concept of the protest vote consists of two elements. The first element distinguishing a protest vote from other types of votes is that discontent with politics (reflected in political cynicism, or lack of political trust) should have a strong effect on support for a radical right party (e.g., Van der Brug 2003; Aarts 2006) . The second element is, in the words of Lubbers & Scheepers (2000:69) that "political attitudes … are expected to be of minor importance". The main motivation behind a protest vote is, after all, not to affect public policies but to express discontent (see also : Kitschelt 1996; Mayer & Perrineau 1992; Kitschelt 1995; Mudde & Van Holsteyn 2000) .
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Wouter van der Brug and Meindert Fennema In previous studies Van der and Van der Brug and Fennema (2003) effect on the vote for the radical right LPF as on the Christian democratic party, which was the largest opposition party. They interpret this effecteven though it is not significant -as evidence in support of the protest vote
hypothesis. Yet they did not answer the question of whether Christian democratic voters should be considered protest voters as well.
We therefore propose to make a qualitative distinction between protest voting and policy voting. In this conceptualization, voters who support a party because they agree with it on important policy considerations will be The total sample in these countries thus consists of 9,162 respondents, which is about 1,145 on average per country.
To compare the motives for supporting a radical right party with the motives for supporting other parties we employ a method that was proposed by Van der Eijk and Franklin (1996) . In each country voters were asked, for each party in their political system, 4 how likely it was (on a scale of 1 to 10) that they would ever vote for it. These questions have been carefully designed to yield measures that can be interpreted as the propensity to vote for each of the parties (van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; van der Eijk 2002; Van der Eijk et al. 2006) . For ease of exposition these measures can be regarded as preferences, but we know that voters make their choice in each election for the party they most prefer.
5
Having measures of vote propensity serves many purposes, but in this paper the most important is to provide us with a dependent variable that is
The support base of radical right parties in the enlarged European Union 305 comparable across parties (from the same party system, as well as from different party systems): the propensity to vote for a party. When the data matrix is stacked so that each voter appears as many times as there are parties for which her utility has been measured (and other variables have been appropriately transformed as explained below), we can pose the question, "What is it that makes a vote for a party attractive to voters?" We already know that voters almost always choose to vote for the party to which they
give highest propensity to vote (see note 5). An answer to the question, "What is it that makes a vote for a party attractive to voters?" is therefore also an answer to the question, "What determines which parties are voted for?" The use of this measure to analyze the determinants of party choice has been validated elsewhere (Tillie 1995; Van der Eijk et al. 2006 ). There are three conceptual and methodological reasons for using the `propensity to support' questions as a dependent variable to answer our research questions.
The first is that the `propensity to support' items allow for a research design that is truly comparative (see below The EES 2004 asked this question for 9 radical right parties, all mentioned in the introduction, from eight European countries: Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy and the Netherlands. To assess whether voters evaluate these 9 parties by the same criteria as they apply to other parties, our study concentrates on the electoral attractiveness of all parties (58 in total) in the eight political systems included in this study. A valid way to analyse individual and inter-party level variations in party preferences simultaneously can be achieved by arranging the data in the so-called `stacked' (or 'pooled') form that was first proposed by Stimson (1985) and after that applied frequently in electoral research (e.g., MacDonald, Listhaug and Rabinowitz, 1991; van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Westholm, 1997) . In this stacked data matrix each respondent is represented by as many `cases' as there are parties for which (s)he was asked to indicate vote propensity. This matrix allows us to apply multiple regression in order to explain parties'
The support base of radical right parties in the enlarged European Union 307 electoral attractiveness. By adding characteristics of political systems and parties as variables in the stacked data matrix, such characteristics can be included as variables in these regression analyses. In order to assess whether voting for radical right parties involves a different kind of decision than does voting for other parties, we will estimate interaction terms for a radical right party on the one hand and a set of independent variables on the other. Before we do this, let us discuss which independent variables in the equation can predict parties' electoral attractiveness and how these are treated in the stacked matrix.
The first predictor of party preference is the subjectively perceived distance These were used to assess the influence of political priorities on party preferences.
In addition to these attitude scales, we included a number of socio-structural and demographic variables in the model: social class, education, gender, religion and age. Class is measured using a variable asking for the respondent's subjective idea of his/her social class. Religion is a composite variable made up of religious denomination and church attendance.
Creating the stacked data matrix produces a dependent variable, party preference, that is generic in the sense of having no party-specific meaning.
The problem here, though, is that the relationships between dependent and independent variables are usually directionally specific. For example, church attendance can be expected to have a negative effect on support for a liberal party and a positive one on support for a Christian democratic party. In the case of the effect of left/right ideology, this directionality problem could be easily overcome when computing the ideological distance between each party and each respondent. This was not the case for the socio-structural and the attitude scales, however, since the surveys do not contain matching party characteristics for them. In order, therefore, to create generic independent variables that can be stacked on top of each other, we adopted a procedure that involves the linear transformation of the original socio-structural and issue variables (see e.g., Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Van der Brug, 2004) . One outcome of this transformation of some of the predictor variables is that their influence will always be positive. In a number of steps we will assess the extent to which support of radical right parties is determined by particular considerations that exert less (or no) effect on support of other parties. These party specific considerations are detected in the following way. First, we will start with an estimation of the regression model using the stacked matrix that includes all 58 parties., We will also do the same for the subgroup of 9 radical right parties, and for the 49 other parties. These analyses will only allow for an ad oculum comparison of differences in the effect parameters. As a final step we will therefore explore whether significant interaction effects exist between each of the radical right parties on the one hand and various predictors of party preference on the other. This will be done for the model that was estimated for the total of 58 parties. Such interaction effects, were they to exist, would indicate that support of radical right parties is determined by party specific factors. If we cannot find such interaction effects, or if they turn out to be very small, then we will have to conclude that voters treat radical right parties just like any other party. Table 1 are not fully comparable to those in previous studies. However, a few general remarks can be made about the model that we tested for 58 parties. In all three years the left/right distance between parties and voters is the strongest determinant of electoral preferences judging by the magnitude of the standardized coefficients. The significance of the left/right dimension for structuring the behaviour of voters has been observed by many scholars (e.g., Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990; Van der Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Hix, 1999; Schmitt, 2001) .
Results
Another stable finding is that party size is the variable with the second strongest effect on party preference. The positive effect of party size shows that, after controlling for policy positions and social characteristics, voters consider a larger party more attractive than a smaller one. Voters who wish to influence policy making take into account the strategic consideration that a
The support base of radical right parties in the enlarged European Union 311 large party has a better chance than a smaller one of realising its policy goals.
So, electoral preferences are determined by a combination of ideological and pragmatic considerations. The magnitude of the effects of socio-structural variables, issue priorities and attitudes towards the EU, is also remarkably stable. There is only one major difference in comparison with the other years, Government approval has a substantively stronger effect in 2004 than it had in the other election years. In
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Wouter van der Brug and Meindert Fennema 1999 , the standardized effect of government approval was 0.09, whereas in 2004 it is 0.22. Voters tend to base their electoral preferences on their evaluation of the performance of parties in government more than in previous years. Since it is beyond the scope of this paper, we will not explore this matter further here.
How does this general model compare to the model for the 9 radical right parties? The most important conclusion from Table 1 is that most of the effects are quite similar in magnitude. Note that as a result of the linear transformations of most of the independent variables, those parameters are necessarily positive, so that no conclusions can be drawn about the direction of the effects. Socio-structural and demographic characteristics -gender, age, religion, social class and education -have almost the same weak effect on electoral preferences for radical right parties as on electoral preferences for other parties. The effect of left/right distance on electoral preferences is also very similar for the two groups of parties.
Judging by the standardized coefficients, two variables exert weaker effects.
The first one is party size, but this difference may be caused by the fact that the variation in party size is substantially smaller among the radical right parties than among the other parties. Note also that the unstandardized coefficient is higher, so that we have to be particularly careful when comparing these effects across different equations. The other effect that is substantially weaker among radical right parties than among other parties is approval of the government. The most likely explanation for this weaker effect is that there are relatively few government parties among the radical right parties, and that this variable has a particularly strong effect on electoral preferences for government parties. We may conclude, however, that support for radical right parties is not strongly determined by dissatisfaction with the government.
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In contrast to what one might expect a priori on the basis of the nationalist ideologies of parties of the radical right, differences on the issue of European integration exert an effect on preferences for radical right-wing parties that is very similar to the effect it has on preferences for other parties. The same goes for citizens' satisfaction with the EU and satisfaction with the way democracy functions. Despite the anti-parliamentarian rhetoric of these parties, dissatisfaction with democracy is not an important motive for citizens to support these types of parties.
In 1989 and 1994 negative attitudes towards immigrants turned out to be a strong determinant of the vote for radical right parties. The EES of 2004 does not contain measures of attitudes towards immigrants, so the effect of this issue cannot be tested. In many countries the issue will be incorporated in the left/right dimension, so to some extent the strong effect of left/right distances reflects the effect attitudes towards immigrants, but the explained variance of the model would certainly have been higher if these attitudes had been measured.
A final important observation is that socio-structural and demographic variables exert only very weak effects on electoral preferences for either radical right or other parties. Various scholars have observed that cleavage politics is declining in most countries and that this decline is largely compensated for by an increase in policy voting (Franklin, 1992:400) .
Instead of relying on social positions as a cue when deciding which party to vote for, the increasingly autonomous citizens vote largely on the basis of their policy preferences (e.g., Rose and McAllister, 1986; Dalton, 1996) . Our results show that this is just as true of supporters of radical right parties as it is of voters for other parties. Radical right parties do not attract the 'losers of modernity' as Betz used to call them, but they do attract their supporters from across all social strata.
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Wouter van der Brug and Meindert Fennema The comparisons between electoral preferences for various radical right parties and those for other parties have so far been made for all 9 parties of the radical right together, and on an ad oculum basis. The design of our analysis, with a stacked data matrix in which electoral preferences are studied for all parties simultaneously, provides the opportunity to study differences between radical right-wing parties systematically, and, also to study those between radical right-wing parties and other parties. If a variable has a different effect for one party than it does for all other parties, the regression model should contain an interaction term between the respective party on the one hand and this variable on the other.
To estimate these interactions, we developed two models. The first is the model in Table 1 which is estimated for all 58 parties with three interactions added to the model: interactions between a dummy variable that separates the 9 radical right parties from the other 49 on the one hand, and party size, left/right distance and distance on the issue of European unification on the other. 8 Model 1 in Table 2 presents the parameter estimates of these interaction terms as well as the main effects of party size, left/right distance and distance on European unification. The models also included the effects of the other independent variables presented in Table 1 , but these are not presented, because in order to assess whether the determinants of support for radical right parties are different from the determinants of support for other parties, we need only look at the interaction effects.
The analysis using one dummy variable for the 9 radical right parties together, yields significant positive interaction effects for left/right distance and for party size. These interaction effects must be compared with the main effects in order to interpret them. The main effect of left-right distance on electoral attractiveness (for all parties) is -.401. This negative effect is as expected: the larger the ideological distance the less attractive a party is. The positive interaction effect of left/right distance shows that the negative effect of left-right distance is somewhat weaker for radical right-wing parties than
The support base of radical right parties in the enlarged European Union 315 for the other parties: the unstandardized effect for radical right parties is -.252 (-.401 + .148). The positive interaction effect of party size in Table 2 shows that radical right-wing parties gain more by becoming larger than do other parties. We should, however, take into account the fact that the radical right parties in our sample tend to be relatively small. So, the larger effect could be indicative of certain threshold effects for small parties, as a result of which small parties may benefit more from growth than large parties would.
The third interaction term, the one for European unification, turns out not to be statistically significant so this issue has the same weak effect on preferences for radical right parties as on preferences for other parties. In other words, anti-EU feelings contribute little to support for the radical right. In the second model we look at all 9 radical right parties separately.
Therefore, instead of using a single dummy variable for the 9 radical right parties combined, we added a dummy for each one of them. And we added the interactions between these dummy variables and distances on left/right and on European unification. The relevant results of this model (Model 2) are presented in the lower half of 
Conclusion and discussion
Are radical right parties different from other parties in terms of how they attract votes? In the analysis we focused on the differences, and indeed we found some important differences between radical right parties and other parties. The most important difference is that the effect of left/right tends to be weaker. However, when we focus on these differences we tend to overlook large similarities.
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A first similarity between the processes that generate support for radical right wing parties and processes generating support for other parties is that the effects of socio-structural variables are weak. This means that radical right wing parties, like most other parties, attract their support from across all strata in society. Secondly, left/right distance is the strongest predictor of support for radical right parties as well as for other parties, even though the effect is weaker for the former than the latter. Thirdly, the effect of party size is at least as important for radical right parties as it is for other parties, so that we may conclude that the pragmatic consideration that a larger party is more attractive than a smaller one because it is in a better position to affect public policies, is just as important to voters when judging a radical right party as it is when judging other parties. Finally, neither dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy, dissatisfaction with European unification, nor dissatisfaction with the government exerts a strong effect on support for radical right parties. Because of all these similarities, we should be careful not to think of supporters of radical right parties as being the 'losers of modernity' as Betz (1994) used to call them, or as supporting these parties to express general feelings of discontent.
On the other hand, our analyses have revealed large changes since Van der Brug, Fennema and Tillie (2000) concluded, on the basis of the 1994 EES data, that there were hardly any differences between the determinants of support for radical right parties and the determinants of votes for other parties. Nowadays the main difference is that the effect of left/right is weaker. So, why do voters no longer evaluate these parties by their left/right position as much as they used to?
A possible explanation could be that many of these parties, such as the FPÖ, the Republikaner, and Front National, which were once evaluated in left/right terms, have lost whatever credibility they used to have as a result of poor performance as government parties (FPÖ) and internal party conflicts (which have occurred in all of these three). In addition, mainstream right-leaning 318
Wouter van der Brug and Meindert Fennema parties in many countries have to some extent co-opted the anti-immigration positions of the radical right. It is conceivable that the single issue character of these parties became more evident and more problematic when their prime issues were co-opted. We expect the effect of left/right to be weaker for single issue parties than for parties with a broader ideological profile, because left/right is a generic ideological dimension. Moreover, when these parties lose their 'unique selling proposition' because the mainstream right co-opts their core issues their protest character may also become more visible.
The parties that resisted this trend, the Dansk Folkepartit and Alleanza Nazionale, have managed to build up a good, functioning party organization.
They have either been members of a coalition government (AN) or have passively supported a government (DFP), without creating internal party struggles. Because of this they have been able to promote the further restriction of immigration, 9 but they are still evaluated in generic terms and not only in connection to the issue of immigration. This may be the key to their sustained electoral success.
Notes
1 Some even used 1930s jargon, such as the "fall of the Occident".
2 Unfortunately, we cannot include Vlaams Blok from Flanders, Front National from Wallonia, New Democracy from Sweden, the British National Party from Britain and the National Party from Poland, because the relevant variables are missing. 3 For some smaller radical right parties, such as the Dutch Centrumdemocraten, these studies found only very weak effects of policy preferences. This could mean that the supporters of such parties were indeed protest voters, but in the absence of indicators of discontent, this cannot be established. 4 In practice the parties asked about included only those with representation in the national parliament or those widely expected to obtain representation in the European Parliament. 5 In practice this occurs about 93% of the time in established EU member states.
